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ABSTRACT
The infamous 2017 Equifax breach not only compromised millions of citizens’ data, but
the breach also left Equifax vulnerable to lawsuits that claim the company acted
negligently. This thesis analyzes the events and facts behind the incident to determine the
probable outcome of the main case against Equifax. A claim of a breach can come from
either Equifax’s data protection or breach response. This thesis concludes the results of
the case depends on the final court to determine if Equifax acted negligently with its data
protection. If the case ends in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, the court will
probably decide Equifax was negligent. If the case ends in the Supreme Court, the Court
will probably decide Equifax was not negligent. This thesis also concludes that Equifax
did not act negligently with its response to the breach.
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Introduction
The collection and use of data have quickly become a vital part of the business
world with terms such as “Big Data” dominating corporate philosophy. This trend
unfortunately also brings a heavy repercussion to many citizens. Multiple data breaches
occur each year that compromise people’s financial information. An identity theft
brought on from a data breach can cost hundreds of hours and thousands of dollars to
resolve (Synovate, 2017). This thesis examines if Equifax acted negligently with the
company’s data protection and breach response during the 2017 data breach. Negligence
is defined as “A failure to behave with the level of care that someone of ordinary
prudence would have exercised under the same circumstances. The behavior usually
consists of actions, but can also consist of omissions when there is some duty to act”
(Legal Information Institute, 2017). To determine if Equifax was negligent, the thesis will
examine 1) if Equifax has a duty to protect data and notify breach victims and 2) if
Equifax does have a duty, did Equifax breach one or both duties with their actions or lack
of actions. Fully understanding the issue requires a base level of knowledge of the
following concepts.
Consumer Reporting Agency
A consumer reporting agency (CRA), also known as a credit reporting agency or
credit bureau, collects individuals’ financial information to generate financial reports.
Three major CRAs exist in the United States: Experian, TransUnion, and Equifax. The
reports generated by the CRAs provide the information behind FICO® Scores which rate
individuals on their credit worthiness. CRAs normally sell these reports to banks, lenders,
and other business for various reasons. The US government doesn’t directly own or
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control any CRAs, but Congress has enacted laws concerning CRAs’ operations. The
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has oversight over CRAs to ensure compliance with
these laws and regulations.
Equifax Data Breach
The following bullet point list represents the simplified and condensed version of
the series of events that lead to the breach according to the former CEO of Equifax
(Smith, 2017). Even though the statement comes from the culpable party, this source
provides the most detailed and extensive account of the situation. The United States
Government Accountability Office has verified multiple events in its report which lends
further credibility to the testimony (2018). Some additional details have been added from
Smith’s other statements from the same hearing or from other sources.
● March 8, 2017: Homeland security issued a notice to multiple companies about a
vulnerability for the software “Apache Struts.” The software developer released
the associated patch along with the announcement. Equifax used this software in
one of Equifax’s main claims dispute websites.
● March 9: Equifax sent an email to security personnel to update the software in
accordance with their 48-hour policy. Equifax staff failed to update the software
because a sole employee forgot to implement the update.
● March 15: Equifax information system scans failed to detect the vulnerability in
any of the software.
● May 13: The first known date that the hackers probably accessed sensitive
information exploiting the vulnerability. This access probably continued until July
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30, 2017. During this time period, none of Equifax’s security measures detected
the breach.
● July 29: Equifax security department detected suspicious activity with the
website, so security blocked the source.
● July 30: Equifax security found more suspicious activity, so security shut down
the website.
● August 2: Following internal procedures, Equifax hired a law firm for legal
advice, hired a forensic consulting firm to investigate, and notified the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI did not start an investigation yet.
● August 11: Equifax’s internal investigation found that the hackers had access to
consumers’ sensitive information.
● August 15: The sensitive information had been confirmed as stolen. The
investigation continued to determine the scope of the breach.
● September 4: The investigation created a list of 143 million people believed to
have had their personal information stolen. Equifax notified the FBI about the
upcoming planned press release.
● September 7: Equifax released a press release announcing that the breach
impacted personal information relating to 143 million U.S. consumers. The stolen
information mostly consisted of names, Social Security numbers, birth dates,
addresses, and driver’s license numbers.
● September 18: The FBI launched a criminal investigation intended to examine
multiple aspects of the incident (Viswanatha & Kendall, 2017).
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● December 6: The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred
hundreds of cases from every state to Atlanta, Georgia to consolidate all the
individual cases into one case (McDonald, 2017). The cases will be tried at the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia which is under
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (McDonald, 2017).
Negligence
Most plaintiffs use the negligence statute when they want to sue a company for
harm that they have received. The main manner to assess negligence is by using the
reasonable person test. The test asks, “Would a reasonable person have acted the same as
the defendant with normal foreseeable circumstances and consequences?” Negligence
can involve either improper actions or inactions when an entity had a duty to act.
According to the Legal Information Institute, to consider an entity’s actions as
professionally negligent, each of these four elements must stand true:
1. the existence of a legal duty that the defendant owed to the plaintiff
2. defendant's breach of that duty
3. plaintiff's sufferance of an injury
4. proof that defendant's breach caused the injury
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Body
Data Protection
1. Existence of Duty
In general, a person doesn’t need to help or protect someone. This fact changes
when there exists a legal relationship between the parties or when the defendant acted
unlike a reasonable person. For example, if someone is drowning in a pool, a passerby
has no obligation to save that person despite how negatively society might view the
passerby. However, if there is a lifeguard on duty, the lifeguard has a duty to save the
person because saving a drowning person is a part of the lifeguard’s job. A relevant
question to ask is “Does a legal relationship exists between Equifax and the common
consumer?” Even though Equifax has not created a contract with every consumer or even
directly contacted each consumer, Equifax established a relationship when the company
started to collect consumers’ private information.
Equifax places consumers in excess danger since the information Equifax collects
can cause damages to a consumer if the information gets in harm's way. Since Equifax
creates additional danger, Equifax must protect consumers from the foreseeable risks
associated with collecting data. Even though Equifax is not a person, the company still
needs to perform in a way that an entity in a similar position should and normally does
act. This form of “reasonable person” is called the professional standard of care. In this
instance, a responsible company must establish and maintain controls to protect data. A
reasonable company recognizes the harm that can come from an outsider obtaining
private information.
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The importance to protect sensitive information is especially high for an online
access point to a database. Databases have more vulnerabilities when they are connected
to the internet. Online access points serve as easily accessible places hackers choose to
attack. Since online access points will receive the most attacks, companies need to
implement more protections to guard these points of attack. Since Equifax endangered
sensitive information by placing the information in a vulnerable location, Equifax owed a
duty to consumers to protect their sensitive information.
2. Breach of Duty
To protect the data Equifax had collected, Equifax needed to have sufficient
protections and procedures in place. Equifax failed this duty in three areas:
● Maintaining Policy
● Proper Software Audits and Checks
● Backups and Redundancies
Maintaining Policy
Even though Equifax recognized the threat of a breach and implemented a
corporate policy for protection (Equifax Inc., n.d), Equifax’s IT failed to protect the
system with important software updates. A policy of protection serves no purpose if the
company doesn’t properly follow the policy. Even if a company has properly designed
controls, the company has no protections at all if the employees fail to follow prescribed
procedures. The success or failure of a major portion of a company’s system should not
rely solely on one employee like in the Equifax breach. Equifax also did not perform
management checks that Equifax claims on the company’s website (Equifax Inc., n.d).
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Proper Software Audits and Checks
Equifax conducted a software audit that failed to detect any weaknesses in the
software. Presumably, Equifax’s staff neither properly designed nor conducted the audit
since the staff failed to detect the website weakness which was the audit’s sole purpose.
A check doesn’t need to be technical, a simple check could come from a supervisorial
review of the employee’s work. Equifax not only failed to detect the online portal
weakness on just one occasion, but also for an extended period of time. A company
doesn’t need to have a full system audit every day or look at each piece of data, but a
company should at least have the individual controls in place that can detect any outdated
software or unusual events.
Backups and Redundancies
In general, Equifax had too much confidence that the system was invulnerable to
any major errors or attacks. This false confidence caused Equifax to not create any extra
checks or redundancies. The word redundancy often carries a negative connotation, but a
redundancy provides more security in the field of information system design. If one level
of security fails, redundancies back up the function and prevent total failure. The
company who developed the website software stated as much in a press release, “It is
good software engineering practice to have individually secured layers behind a publicfacing presentation layer such as the Apache Struts framework. A breach into the
presentation layer should never empower access to significant or even all back-end
information resources” (The Apache Software Foundation, 2017). A more drastic
example of the importance of redundancies comes from nuclear weapons. No nation
would have total trust with only one mechanism to prevent accidental detonation. The
9

extra protection doesn’t have to cost more than the additional benefits, but one extra layer
of software protection could have prevented this incident.
3. and 4. Damages
For this thesis, the third and fourth elements have been combined because they
both involve a legal grey area. There currently exists a divide in the American courts as
to whether future damages from a data breach allow enough standing for a breach of duty
(Mank, 2017). On one side of the issue, most appellate courts have ruled that the damages
must have already occurred to have a standing (Mank, 2017). On the other side, some
appellate courts have ruled that there exists a standing if the actions caused “substantial
risk” (Mank, 2017). An example of this contention comes from Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA where the Supreme Court decided that the future damages of
compromised data in the case were too speculative. In the case’s ruling, the Supreme
Court did acknowledge that the substantial risk test has been used in prior cases. The
results of the Equifax case will most likely depend on where the case will end.
In the Appellate Court
If the case ends in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, the court will probably
apply the substantial risk test. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals has already favored
a more liberal view in favor of the plaintiff in Curry, et al. v. AvMed, Inc. Under the
substantial risk test, the court will decide that the future harm provides enough standing
for the third and fourth elements of fraud. The theft of data from a database provides
substantial risk of future harm. The main reason hackers take data from servers is to steal
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the identity of the victims or to sell the information to others. Both situations will bring
probable damages to the victims of the Equifax breach.
In the Supreme Court
The issue of whether the Supreme Court will take up this case remains unclear.
The Supreme Court has already denied a request to review a data breach case with Attias
v. CareFirst (Shepard, 2018), but the size and importance of the Equifax breach may push
the Supreme Court to accept this case. If the Supreme Court accepts the case, the Court
will probably utilize a stricter standard to decide the case. The current Supreme Court
tends to favor businesses more than consumers in the Court’s most recent decisions
(Epstein et al., 2017). Under the stricter standard, the future harm will not suffice as
standing for damages. The conservative leaning Supreme Court may use this decision to
urge for Congress to implement a law to punish poor data protection, but the Supreme
Court will probably not venture outside the traditional interpretation of the elements. The
original interpretation requires damages to have already occurred and be provable. Most
of the damages have not occurred yet and there is no way to prove the hackers have
already exploited most of the data for nefarious purposes.
Breach Response
1. Existence of Duty
Equifax needed to notify the public about the data breach in a timely manner since
time can be an important factor with mitigating damages. Victims of data breaches often
can mitigate the damages when they become aware of the data breach. The longer a fraud
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lasts, the more overall value stolen and out of pocket expenses increase. The following
passage from a report commissioned by the FTC illustrates this fact:
“When the misuse was discovered within 5 months of the initial misuse, the value
obtained by the thief was $5,000 or more in only 11% of the cases. Where
discovery took 6 months or more, the value obtained by the thief was at least
$5,000 in 44% of cases. . . Victims who quickly discovered that their information
was being misused were less likely to incur out-of-pocket expenses. No out-ofpocket expenses were incurred by 67% of those who discovered the misuse less
than 6 months after the misuse began. Only 40% of victims who took 6 months or
longer to discover the misuse were able to avoid incurring some such expenses.”
(Synovate, 2017, p. 41-44)
Since Equifax has direct control of when the consumer becomes aware of the
situation, Equifax is also responsible for any additional damages incurred by the
consumer. Equifax can mitigate additional damages if Equifax responds in a timely
manner as a responsible company. The FTC has even published a guideline called “Data
Breach Response: A Guide for Business” so that businesses will know the best way to
respond when they experience a breach.
2. Breach of Duty
“Data Breach Response: A Guide for Business” by the FTC serves as a good
template for how Equifax should have responded. Even though this guideline has no
direct legal binding statutes, the guideline establishes standards that a reasonable
company should follow after a breach. The applicable sections for this guide are the
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responsibility of securing operations and notifying appropriate parties. In general,
Equifax stuck fairly close to the suggested actions.
Securing Operations
The first prescribed action is to contact legal counsel and data forensic experts.
Equifax did so within the first couple of days even before Equifax knew how serious the
data breach was. Equifax responded prudently as the company allowed the data
investigation experts to inspect the issue instead of putting an in-house IT professional in
charge. One of the most important actions for securing operations involves stopping the
data leak when discovered. Equifax shut down the website early on when security first
discovered the security breach.
Notifying Appropriate Parties
After a company secures operations and collects the majority of the facts, the
company should adequately notify the appropriate parties. A company should first notify
appropriate law enforcement to ensure a proper investigation of the issue. Equifax did so
by contacting the FBI when Equifax first discovered the breach. Equifax hasn’t
specifically disclosed if the company notified all state authorities, but Equifax probably
did because no state governmental claims have come to light. The most important entity
to notify is the consumers who had their data exposed. The notification should not only
let the consumers know they are vulnerable, but the notifications should also fully and
clearly describe what the company knows about the situation. In Equifax’s press release,
Equifax described how the incident occurred, what information was taken, and what
actions they have taken to remedy the situation (Equifax, 2017).
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Small Area of Vulnerability
The only area that makes Equifax vulnerable to a standing of a breach of duty
comes from Equifax’s mishandling of the online breach help resources. To help
consumers find out if they were compromised, Equifax set up a website to allow
consumers to check their statuses. The problem with the help resources comes from how
little effort Equifax put behind the website and the accompanying hotline. An example of
incidents includes people not receiving a requested response or the resources not working
because of an influx of traffic (Singletary, 2017). This delay effectively caused the
majority of consumers to not receive the breach notification till weeks later. An influx of
traffic is normal when consumers learn of an unexpected security breach, but Equifax had
around a month to fully prepare all the systems for the foreseeable new traffic. Since
Equifax did not properly prepare its resources, it may still be vulnerable to a standing.
3. and 4. Damage
For the majority of the victims of the data breach, they were not significantly
damaged in the one-month period between discovery and notification. The hackers
couldn’t fully capitalize on all the information collected during the short period of time.
The plaintiffs would struggle to demonstrate that the majority of the victims will
experience increased damages between discovery and notification. The main harm of a
data breach doesn’t come from the immediate impact, but from the lifelong harm of
compromised sensitive information. The third and fourth elements of negligence will not
have sufficient standing using either the substantial risk test or the traditional test.

14

Conclusion
Data Protection
Equifax had a legal duty to protect consumers’ data and breached that duty by
allowing weaknesses and failing to detect the breach. Whether the plaintiffs suffered
damages and if Equifax's breach caused the damages depends on the interpretation by the
final court. If the Eleventh District Court of Appeals has the final decision, the court will
probably decide Equifax caused damages so Equifax was negligent. If the Supreme Court
has the final decision, the court will probably decide Equifax did not cause damages so
Equifax was not negligent.
Breach Response
Equifax had a legal duty to respond in an appropriate manner to a data breach.
Equifax did not breach their duty to respond to the data breach, the plaintiffs did not
suffer damages from the response, and Equifax's breach did not cause the damages.
Therefore, Equifax was not negligent with the company’s breach response.
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